Almaz Zelleke, ≥A Feminist Critique of Reciprocity and Conditionality,≤ presented at the Plenary Panel on Women, Family, and the Basic Income Guarantee, at the Fourth U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Congress, March 3-5, 2005, New York City

Work in progress, March 2005 draft

1. Introduction

I come to this panel from a background in political theory, and my own work on basic income is an exploration of arguments for and against unconditionality. Today I will explore the implications of feminist theory on arguments for basic income, and argue that a feminist perspective supports the idea of an unconditional basic income. I will explore this idea by first summarizing some of the contributions of feminist theory that are relevant to the basic income debate. Then I will tentatively propose some principles of a feminist theory of justice. I will conclude by applying these principles to the question of the conditionality or unconditionality of basic income.

2. Separate Spheres

One of feminist theoryπs most important contributions to political philosophy has been to question the separation of social life into public and domestic spheres, a construct that has enabled generations of philosophers to limit their theories to the former and virtually to ignore the latter. Justice, rights, and the rule of law govern the public sphere, while love, altruism, and privacy govern the domestic sphere. Most of the basic income debate accepts the separate spheres model (McKay 2001), and basic income advocates—myself included—argue for basic income on grounds of distributive justice, the rights of citizenship, and so on (see, e.g., Van Parijs 1995, Standing 2002, Zelleke 2005, and Zelleke forthcoming).

Feminists have critiqued the separate spheres model for several reasons. First, the idea of a private domestic sphere allows injustice to flourish within the family—including the gendered distribution of labor and the grave injustice of family violence; second, the gendered inequality of the domestic sphere necessarily spills over into the public sphere, where womenπs disproportionate domestic responsibilities prevent us from competing fairly with men for jobs, political power, and other forms of influence, and often relegates us to providing most of societyπs low-paid care as well (Okin 1989, Young 1995, Kymlicka 2002). But the third reason is one which would hold no matter who was primarily responsible for care work in the domestic sphere: that the primacy in our moral imaginations and our social institutions of the model of competent adults responsible for their ends and actions fails to recognize the enormous amount of work that goes on in the domestic sphere to make the public sphere possible, and ignores the constraints that caregivers confront when they enter the public sphere and are unable to leave the domestic sphere fully behind (Okin 1989, Baier 1994, Fraser 1997, Kymlicka 2002).

Thus, the question of what work responsibilities adult citizens have—one of the questions at issue in basic income debate—can only take place upon the foundation of the enormous amount of unpaid work that transforms dependent infants into ≥independent≤ adults (Okin 1989, Tronto 1993, Kittay 1999). Furthermore, the ≥independence≤ of these now-adults is only maintained to the extent that chance—or more likely, gender—preserves them from being providers of unpaid care. In addition, some number of adults will never achieve independence or will lose it for a time because of handicap or age-related disability. In light of these widespread and quite natural limitations on competence and independence, it is a wonder these ideals have such a hold on liberal theory (Tronto 1993, Clement 1996, Kymlicka 2002). That they do is due to the pervasiveness of the separate spheres model and the primacy it gives to the public sphere. If, instead, we shift our perspective from the occasionally independent to the more pervasively dependent and interdependent—that is, from the public to the domestic sphere—a more radical understanding of exploitation, reciprocity, and responsibility—the concepts at issue in the debate over unconditionality—emerges.

3. Justice vs. an Ethic of Care

As we shift our focus to the domestic sphere—to the sphere of dependence and interdependence, need and unpredictability—we need to ask whether the framework of justice and rights that we apply to the public sphere is up to the task. Many feminist theorists, building on the work of Carol Gilligan, have suggested that because of either biology or socialization, women are more likely to view the world according to an ethic of care, rather than justice (Gilligan 1982, Noddings 1986; see also Tronto 1993, Baier 1994). The ethic of care prioritizes the creation and advancement of relationships, the recognition of subjective needs, and the provision of care, rather than the pursuit of oneπs own ends according to formal rules that apply equally to all.

The framework of justice, concerned as it is with competence and responsibility, can describe at best a part of the domestic sphere, and yet is essential precisely in ensuring that those who need care receive it. On the other hand, the virtues of love and altruism seem to describe a larger part of the domestic sphere, but they are limited in their ability to help us understand how the responsibilities of care ought to be distributed. The debate over the ethic of care demonstrates that we need a bridge between justice and altruism, to remind us that the concepts of exploitation and reciprocity apply to the domestic sphere as well as the public, and that the world of care and needs constrains the lives of adults in the public sphere as well as the domestic (Tronto 1993; see also Clement 1996). The ethic of care suggests that the fundamental—and most challenging—case of justice is not relations between independent adults who are fully responsible for their ends, as traditional theories of justice hold, but relations among those who are interdependent and often not responsible for their actions or needs (Held 1987, Kymlicka 2002). A theory of justice that does justice to the world of care requires principles that guide relations not only between adults capable of making and honoring commitments but also with those who cannot, and a just society requires social institutions and policies that support and reward the provision of care.

4. A Feminist Theory of Justice

Iπm now going to make some tentative proposals about what the principles of a feminist theory of justice might be. The principles that Iπm going to suggest will sound familiar to students of traditional theories of justice. They are: equality, autonomy, reciprocity, and pluralism. But when viewed through a feminist perspective, and through the lens of the domestic sphere in particular, they take on different meanings than they do in traditional theories of justice. I will say a bit about how this perspective shifts each of their meanings and discuss their policy implications.

First, Equality. When the realities of interdependence and responsibility for caregiving are given priority over the ideal of independence, it is clear that womenπs equality cannot mean only the absence of overt discrimination. Equality of respect means first and foremost that the exploitation of unpaid and low-paid caregivers by those who are shielded from the responsibilities of care, must end (Okin 1989, Fraser 1997). This requires increasing the compensation of low-paid caregivers, and devising a way to compensate unpaid caregivers. Several ways of compensating care have been suggested, and I will turn to them shortly.

Equality of respect, together with the principle of Autonomy, further requires that the burdens and rewards of caregiving, as well as the burdens and rewards of other occupations, are not disproportionately distributed by gender or any other suspect category, including race (Pateman 1987, Okin 1989, Fraser 1997, Glenn 1992). A just society must ensure that everyone has at least some opportunity to step away from those responsibilities, to choose and pursue their own ends. This realm of autonomy can never be fully shielded from the realm of care, as the ideology of the separate spheres implies; a just society will be ordered in a way that facilitates movement between the two for all its members (Clement 1996). This poses a stronger institutional challenge than compensating care, because respect for autonomy, not to mention the interests of care recipients themselves, precludes forcing those not so inclined to undertake caregiving duties. But we can as a society take steps to make sharing caregiving responsibilities easier and more attractive for women and men, and some of these are obvious: the wider availability of part-time work and job-sharing; periodic leave for full-time caregiving; the decoupling of access to benefits like health insurance and pension plans from paid employment; and the widespread availability of care centers for children, the elderly, and adults unable to care for themselves.

Next, Reciprocity. The first care we all receive, as infants and children, is given to us unconditionally out of love, not according to any distributional principle, and not in the expectation that it will be repaid. There is no way to reciprocate directly for this care—it is, after all, the gift of life, a gift our parents or caregivers have already received from others. But it can, and should be reciprocated socially—to our own children, or to others in need of care. Seen through the lens of the domestic sphere, the principle of reciprocity loses the punitive character that it has in much of the basic income debate (see, e.g., Gutmann and Thompson 1996, White 2003). Rather than implying a selective duty for the poor to work in return for subsistence benefits, the principle of reciprocity requires that we all reciprocate for the care we all receive, and to do so unconditionally, in the manner in which the care we received was given. This implies not only an unconditional basic income generous enough to cover basic needs, including food and shelter, but universal access to at least a minimum of health care and education.

Finally, Pluralism. The feminist perspective enjoins us to ensure that all individuals have a voice in the development of social norms and the ability to contest those norms. What we take to be ≥normal≤ must not be the result of one groupπs dominance over another, as is currently the case with our prevailing male-centric norm of what it means to be a contributing member of society. The just society will ensure that all its members have an effective voice in the allocation of social resources to different ends and in the valuation of different ways of life. To achieve this, individuals must have the means to make different life choices and to contribute by their example to our collective understanding of the ≥normal≤ balance of paid work, caregiving, and leisure (Gross 1986, Young 1995, Zelleke forthcoming).

5. The Caregiver Credit, Participation Income, and Unconditional Basic Income

I now turn the question I began with: is an unconditional basic income compatible with the principles of a feminist theory of justice, and if so, is it a better embodiment of those principles than conditional ways of compensating care, specifically through a caregiver credit or a participation income? (See Kittay 1999 and Young 1995 for proposals for a caregiver credit, or income, and a participation income, respectively.)

An unconditional basic income, I argue, best compensates care work in accordance with the principles of a feminist theory of justice. First, basic income provides every child and adult a guaranteed minimum income at or near the level required for basic subsistence, virtually eliminating poverty and fulfilling the feminist reciprocity principle. Second, basic income provides caregivers with resources to use as they prefer: as a personal caregiving stipend, to pay for care provided by others, or indeed, for any other purpose, thereby supporting care and supporting the autonomy of caregivers. Third, by redistributing income to those with the least, basic income redistributes power to societyπs most vulnerable members (Kymlicka 2002). For those in need of care, it reduces the power imbalance between care recipients and caregivers by guaranteeing dependents at least minimal resources, thereby fostering equality of respect. It reduces power imbalances within the family, where it provides caregivers financial resources and a social status comparable to a wage earnerπs. And it provides a wage supplement and a bit of bargaining power to low-paid workers.

Most importantly, basic income compensates care and societyπs other unpaid work without reinforcing the existing gendered distribution of labor or the primacy of the public sphere by equating care with work. Together with some of the strategies I mentioned earlier to increase the flexibility of paid employment, basic income promotes the ability of individuals to choose the mix of paid work, care, and leisure that best meets their needs at any given time. Because of this, basic income has the most potential of any compensation scheme to transform over time the relation of both men and women to the provision of care and to the world of paid employment.

Now, if we examine the idea of a caregiverπs credit—a stipend paid to those verifiably providing care—or the idea of a participation income—a basic income paid to those who either work in paid employment or in qualified unpaid pursuits, including caregiving, volunteer work, and so on—it appears that basic income has at least three points in its favor over these alternatives. First, while a caregiver credit and a participation income meet the goal of compensating care, they do little or nothing to challenge the distribution of care. Under these programs, care work is compensated because it is seen as making a productive contribution, like having a paid job, thereby reinforcing the status of paid work as the paradigmatic form of social contribution. Therefore, they reinforce the inclination of many women to provide care while doing nothing to encourage men to reduce their attachment to paid employment and contribute more care. Second, because the caregiver credit and the participation income go to the caregivers, and not to care recipients, they do not have the effect of reducing the power imbalance between caregivers and care recipients. Third, because the caregiver credit and the participation income are conditional incomes, neither guarantees the elimination of poverty as effectively as basic income.

6. Conclusion

To sum up, let me acknowledge that itπs easy for basic income advocates to get carried away and speak as though basic income is the answer to all of contemporary capitalismπs problems. It is not, and by the same token, either a caregiverπs credit or a participation income would be a huge improvement over a status quo that neither compensates care nor distributes it fairly, and that leaves millions of children and adults in poverty. But an unconditional basic income is the policy alternative that gives all members of society, deemed ≥contributing≤ or not, the best chance of achieving equality of respect and a degree of autonomy while valuing the traditional work of women as highly as that of men.

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Copyright Almaz Zelleke 2005